However, there appears to be considerable support for the principle of active voluntary euthanasia, demonstrated both in surveys of public attitudes, which suggest that about three-quarters of the population are in favour of the concept (4, 5) , and in recent academic and professional opinion. For instance, the working party report of the Age Concern Institute of Gerontology and the Centre of Medical Law and Ethics at King's College, London, entitled 'The Living Will', commented in its introduction that:
'To change the law would appear to be in keeping with the logic of respect for autonomy reflected in this report' (6) .
The arguments for legalising euthanasia may be divided, somewhat artificially, into the moral and the material, the moral arguments having been further divided by Glanville Williams several years ago into those concerned with the prevention of cruelty and those involving the protection of liberty (7) . The material arguments, particularly regarding the economic cost to families and the demographic burden to society ofthe increasing number ofelderly members of the population (8) , are perhaps more likely to prevail than the moral ones, but, in view of the inevitability of the potential for conflicts of interest between patients and those on whom they are dependent, these should give rise to caution in advocating any change in law or practice, and may be a reason for contemplating relatively restrictive rather than permissive legislation. The safeguards proposed in the 1936 Bill (9) may therefore be a more suitable model from which to start than the 'wide discretion' originally put forward by Glanville Williams (10) The object of the Bill was to allow voluntary active euthanasia for patients requesting it who were ofsound mind, who were over the age of 21 and who were suffering from an incurable and fatal illness accompanied by severe pain. It was not intended to provide for mercy-killing on a non-voluntary basis, and it set out to provide stringent safeguards against abuse. The proposal was that a patient requesting euthanasia would be required to sign an application in the presence of two witnesses. This application, accompanied by two medical certificates, would then be sent to an official euthanasia referee appointed by the Minister of Health, who would be obliged to interview the patient himself and be satisfied that the criteria of the Bill were being fulfilled and that the patient genuinely wanted to be enabled to die. If satisfied, he would then issue a licence so that euthanasia could be administered, but only in the presence of an official witness. Lord Horder's distinction Lord Horder disclosed similar 'misgivings' at the proposed 'intervention of the bureau, as replacing that complete confidence and understanding which is one of the most satisfactory of all human relationships'. Again one wonders whether all patients feel quite so ecstatic about their relationships with their doctors.
He also acknowledged that when a doctor was unable to cure, he had twin duties; 'to prolong life so far as may be, and to relieve pain, that worst of evils, both bodily and mental'. He went on to suggest: 'Be it observed that the good doctor is aware of the distinction between prolonging life and prolonging the act of dying'. This distinction is both interesting and important. It leads to the possibility that there may be a significant difference between acts which are seen to affect the cause of death and those which merely influence the mode of dying.
Consider the following clinical vignette:
A few years ago I was called one evening to see a middle-aged man who had been suffering from respiratory insufficiency for a number of years as a consequence of fibrosing alveolitis, for which he had been extensively investigated and treated in the local hospital. I was called to see him by his wife, who was herself in a state of considerable distress as she had watched him suffering from increasing breathlessness for the previous three days, and he had refused readmission to hospital. During this time he had been seen by his own doctor on several occasions. After discussion with his wife in his presence, and with her approval and his apparent agreement although he was no longer capable of giving an unambiguously valid consent, I gave him a small dose of diamorphine. About an hour later I certified his death, and was profusely thanked by his wife for my intervention.
Presumably it could be argued that I killed him and that I should be regarded as negligent if not legally culpable. This would undoubtedly have been true had he been suffering from a potentially reversible asthmatic attack. I think that my defence is due to Lord Horder's distinction. While I obviously influenced the mode of his dying from that of exhaustion as a result of his respiratory effort to stupor associated with respiratory depression, I do not feel that I altered the cause of his death, which remained respiratory insufficiency secondary to fibrosing alveolitis. The important diagnosis to make was that he was inevitably dying in any case.
Parallels with the Mental Health Act 1983
The distinction between influencing the mode ofdying and altering the cause of death is perhaps arbitrary and arguably captious. However, it resembles the distinction between an emergency decision and an elective one to treat a psychiatric patient against his wishes, when an elective decision has to be taken under the terms of the Mental Health Act, but an emergency one may sometimes be justified under common law on grounds of urgent necessity. It may therefore be of relevance in attempting to excuse an 'active intervention' which 'terminates a patient's life' when the patient is already near to death. 3. Emphasising the 'liberty argument', it would be possible to institute a system of Euthanasia Tribunals to whom patients (and perhaps their next of kin or guardians) could appeal, in order to legitimate elective active voluntary euthanasia on a prospective, or anticipatory, basis. Criteria could be specified to ensure that it would only be carried out on those who, for instance: a) Understood the nature of the application that they were making; b) And had an enduring and a considered wish to die, and were not under any form of external duress or coercion, either for financial or for other reasons; c) And were suffering from a condition which was both permanent and incurable, and which was causing them significant distress; d) And were not suffering from any distortion of judgement due to temporary or treatable psychiatric illness.
The intention would be to assist patients in the exercise of their present liberty, under the Suicide Act 1961, to choose to die, but only if and when it appeared compassionate to do so, and without in any way converting that liberty into a right which could be acted upon inappropriately or capriciously.
In view of the greater gravity of the issue being examined, the Tribunal might comprise five members, rather than the three of the Mental Health Review Tribunals.
1. A chairman, with a suitable legal qualification and experience. 2. A medical practitioner, with a special interest in the illness from which the patient suffers. 3. A psychiatrist, in order to exclude the presence of treatable mental illness, and to provide a psychotherapeutic input if required. 4. A solicitor or social worker, to examine the social and especially the financial implications of the death being contemplated, in order to minimise the possibility of duress. 5. A layperson, to provide a balancing and general perspective. This is clearly the most radical ofthe three suggestions, in that it overturns the tradition of compulsory submission to theological doctrine and to medical authority. However, it is difficult to see that in a free society it should not be available. Perhaps it is appropriate to illustrate it with a second vignette:
A 75-year-old widow recently underwent a laparotomy for a cancer of the stomach which was found to be inoperable. She lives alone, having witnessed her husband's slow death from cancer of the lung in a nursing home a few years ago. While she has nothing but praise for the care that he then received, she personally does not think that she would feel that life in such a home would be 'worthwhile' to her, and therefore she would like to request assistance to take her own life, sitting in the garden that she made with her husband, when she no longer has the ability to look after herself at home. (13) , the medical profession has historically also opposed the introduction of analgesia in childbirth, of contraception and of abortion.
4. 'It would undermine much of the splendid work of the hospice movement'. I suppose that this would be by depriving them of clinical material, rather in the same way that abortion services presumably might be held to undermine the splendid work of those who seek to care for single mothers. This argument is nonsense. The proposal for a tribunal outlined above would merely complement the achievements of the hospice movement, and could be available within an integrated service as an option for those who might wish to consider it, and be entirely ignored by those who might prefer to reject it on religious, philosophical or any other grounds.
If the balance to the protection of liberty is the defence of security, perhaps one underlying reason for the opposition to the change in the law on euthanasia concerns the containment of anxiety at both personal and social levels (14) by the means of defensive solutions, and the increase in perceived anxiety ifthese solutions are challenged. If society, as represented by our legislators, elects to avoid anxieties over death by postures of dependency on the medical profession, as exemplified by Mr Nelson's speech, the profession is likely to respond by adopting restrictive solutions in order to cope with the responsibilities involved, principally in order to contain its own levels ofanxiety. It is not then useful for laymen like Ludovic Kennedy to accuse the profession of being 'prejudiced, irresponsible and cowardly' even ifall these things may possibly be true. A more useful response might be to design and advocate models whereby, on the liberty argument, patients would take responsibility for their own decisions rather than being encouraged to project this responsibility onto their doctors, and on the more paternalistic cruelty argument concerning nonvoluntary euthanasia, adequate resources were provided to support the profession so as to be less defensive in taking non-treatment decisions in anticipation of patients' deaths.
However, there is also a realistic concern that any attempt to legalise euthanasia as a 'right to die' would be open to abuse by those with a masochistically motivated lust for renunciation, or would provide an opportunity for the manipulative control of others by patients with patterns ofpassive hostility towards those on whom they become dependent. It would be necessary for society to construct an adequate administrative process for the containment of such destructive patterns and passions, and the tribunals described may be offered as one suggestion whereby this might be achieved.
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